"Checks and balances are our only security" — John Adams
[1] Bravo Latvia! If my interpretation is correct, Latvia may be pulling a sensational institutional trick. It has recently adopted amendments to strenghten its constitutional court (*). Imagine for a moment that its constitutional court would work, with the passage of time, like Germany's Bundesverfassungsgericht along the lines suggested by Mogens Herman Hansen [see]. The end result would be a system that is de iure unicameral (Saeima is the name of the Parliament), but de facto bi-cameral. This would be a stroke of genius. Without the expenses of a costly senate, Latvia would strenghten its system of checks and balances — already rendered much more robust with the adoption of the euro. The great John Adams would surely applaud. For my part, I can only say: bravo! Bravissimo! Apsveicam!
[2] More on the 'soft' monarchical principle. In my review of Alexander Thiele's book, I emphasised the importance of the 'weak form' of das monarchische Prinzip [see]. In the (unlikely) event of a power vacuum in a modern European monarchy, a prince stemming from a house with a long tradition of respect for the rule of law would likely step in and work to arrive at a consensus solution to restaure democracy. Remember Juan Carlos I in 1981? This is a problem that plagues modern-day Latin American republics, where a despotic strongman would quickly step in. I'm told that Eileen McDonagh credits the monarchical principle with the success of the welfare state (†). I haven't read her article, but I already find myself whispering: score another one for monarchies!
(*) Linda Spundina: “Latvia adopts amendments to strengthen constitutional Court”, Constitutionnet, 9 September 2020. To the extent that the measures lead to a lower cost of capital, this would compensate the higher cost of labour derived from the adoption of the euro. A truly brilliant move.
(†) Eileen McDonagh: "Ripples from the First Wave: The Monarchical Origins of the Welfare State", Perspectives on Politics, Volume 13, Issue 4 (December 2015). Note the widespread reverence and respect, in these countries, for key government positions that are independent from the executive, especially judges and central bankers. This is also follows, to some extent, from the soft monarchical principle.
______________
No comments:
Post a Comment