CHECKS & BALANCES: THREE SHORT STORIES

AM | @agumack


"Checks and balances are our only security" — John Adams

[1] Hedwig Richter. A week ago I mentioned Prof. Hedwig Richter's book on the history of German democracy [see]. I plan to write a review here (*). Today I want to make a short comment on a remarkable sentence taken from the introduction: Demokratiegeschichte ist immer auch die Geschichte ihrer Einschränkung (p. 13). Here's my translation: "Democracy's history is always, too, the history of its restriction". There is subtle but unmistakeable Aristotle-flavour in this elegant sentence. As democracy advances, the risk of despotic government grows—and that's precisely why we need checks and balances, as Prof. Richter justly remarks. I now take the liberty of proposing an illustration of this principle. (Note: it does not come from the book, and it may or not reflect the author's views).

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Take the case of Chancellor Angela Merkel. Elected for the first time in 2005 as the head of the executive, she is currently the midst of her fourth term. That would be legally impossible, of course, in the United States and in many other countries. Why can Germany afford such blatant disregard for term limits? The short answer is: because the country has a very robust system of checks and balances in place. This is what our 'Index of Checks & Balances' suggests. Germany has better grades than the United States, both in terms of judicial independence and freedom of the press. The German constitutional court in Karlsruhe, as Mogens Herman Hansen famously put it, "is an undemocratic institution set up to defend the democratic ideals" [see]. The central bank —the ECB, to which the Bundesbank is now incorporated— is more independent than the Federal Reserve. And that's how democracy is both extended and restricted.

(*) Hedwig Richter. Demokratie. Eine deustche Affäre. Vom 18. Jahrhundert bis zum Gegenwart. München: C. H. Beck, 2020. Prof. Richter was recently awarded the Anna Krüger Preis für Wissenschaftssprache [see]. There is a recent podcast available here.
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[2] Bulgaria. I used to ask my Bulgarian students: "How can your country handle a fixed exchange rate to the euro, while having such a dismal track record in terms of corruption?" It's not a rhetorical trick. High levels of corruption are the mirror image of weak political checks and balances. In economic terms, the implications of such a mix can be devastating: high cost of capital (due to the lack of judicial independence) and, simultaneously, high cost of labour (due to the EUR-BGN link). That must be a recipe for sluggish job creation, weak economic growth, and perennial fiscal crisis. President Rumen Radev, a vocal critic of the conservative ruling party's record on corruption, has accused prime minister Boyko Borissov of having "links with the oligarchs" (*). The fantastic term 'oligarch' —from oἱ ὀλίγοι and ὀλιγαρχία— shows up three times in this Freedom House report: "Economic oligarchs dominate the major political parties and influence their platforms, a problem that is exacerbated by a lack of transparency in campaign finance law and the lack of limits to private donations for political parties that was lifted in July 2019."

(*) Pascale Davies & Alessio Dell'Anna: "Why is Bulgaria engulfed in daily anti-government protests?", 24 July 2020.
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[3] Mali. D'après le « Comité national pour le salut du peuple (CNSP) » qui a pris le pouvoir à la suite du coup d'État au Mali du 18 août, « ce que l'on a fait, c'est la démocratie, le peuple, par le peuple, pour le peuple » (*). Le président Keita se prenait pour « un monarque ». Soit. En tout cas, l'indifférence du δῆμος est frappante. Certains parlent même d'une réception très favorable. Le putsch est davantage perçu comme un règlement de comptes entre groupes rivaux que comme l'avènement d'une cruelle dictature. On constate également que des incidents ont eu lieu près de la résidence de l'ancien ministre de la justice Kassim Tapo. (C'est souvent la gestion de la justice qui détient la clé des limites du pouvoir). On parle volontiers à Bamako d'une « spirale de coups de force » et même d'un « cycle infernal des coups d'État ». Cela ressemble passablement à l'ἀνακύκλωσις de Polybe. En tout cas, une seule chose paraît certaine : le δῆμος n'a nullement l'intention d'aller à la rescousse de mauvais gouvernants.

(*) Paul Lorgerie : « Mali : militaires et manifestants discutent », Le Monde, 21 août 2020.
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