"Checks and balances are our only security" — John Adams
[1] Lukas Thommen on the Spartan regime. I have recently summarized the findings of three books that deal with Sparta's mixed constitution, with lots of references to Ancient sources (1, 2, 3). This will be an important chapter in my projected book on the history of the idea of checks and balances. Paul Rahe describes the Spartan regime from the VI to IV centuries as "an elaborate system of balances and checks" (in that order). I have just discovered this book by Lukas Thommen (†). Like most historians, he takes a step-by-step approach when describing the elements of this strange, but fascinating, πολιτεία μικτή: the Kings, the Assembly, the ephors and the Gerousia.
[1] Lukas Thommen on the Spartan regime. I have recently summarized the findings of three books that deal with Sparta's mixed constitution, with lots of references to Ancient sources (1, 2, 3). This will be an important chapter in my projected book on the history of the idea of checks and balances. Paul Rahe describes the Spartan regime from the VI to IV centuries as "an elaborate system of balances and checks" (in that order). I have just discovered this book by Lukas Thommen (†). Like most historians, he takes a step-by-step approach when describing the elements of this strange, but fascinating, πολιτεία μικτή: the Kings, the Assembly, the ephors and the Gerousia.
Die Spartanische Verfassung wurde bei den ersten Verfassungsdiskussionen, die in Griechenland in 5. Jahrhundert aufkamen, für ihre Stabilität bewundert [...] Der Grund für die Dauerhaftigkeit der Spartanischen Verfassung wurde allgemein in deren Mischung erkannt. Als in 4. Jahrhundert das Konzept der Mischverfassung aufkam, gab Sparta dafür ein geeignetes Beispeil ab [...] Platon sah darin Elemente der Demokratie, der Aristokratie und der Demokratie -aber auch der Tyrannis- verbunden (nom. 712.d).
(†) Lukas Thommen. Sparta. Verfassungs- und Sozialgeschichte einer griechischen Polis. J. B. Metzler, 2017 [see].
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[2] Friedrich Schiller & 'judicial independence'. Years ago, while living in the Netherlands, I read Schiller's account of the Revolt of the Netherlands in the XVIth century (*). The poet undertook this historical study as background to writing his dramatic piece Don Carlos [see]. I was struck then, as I am now, by a wonderful passage that establishes a link between what we would now call judicial independence and security (†):
So finden wir schon im elften und zwölften Jahrhundert eine gemischte Regierungsverfassung in diesen Ländern, wo die Macht des Souveräns durch den Einfluß der Stände, des Adels nämlich, der Geistlichkeit und der Städte, merklich beschränkt ist [...] Ohne ihre Bewilligung galten keine neuen Gesetze, durften keine Kriege geführt, keine Steuern gehoben, keine Veränderung in der Münze [...] Die Sicherheit des Lebens und Eigentums, die aus mildern Gesetzen und einer gleichen Handhabung der Justiz entsprang, hatte die Betriebsamkeit und den Fleiß in diesen Ländern ermuntert.
(*) Friedrich Schiller. Geschichte des Abfalls der vereinigten Niederlande von der spanischen Regierung (1788).
(†) The idea features explicitely in Diderot [see], in Smith's Wealth of Nations [see] and implicitely in Montesquieu [see] and many others. Note that Montaigne, travelling through Germany at the time of the Dutch revolt, took note of the link between justice et sûreté [see].
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[3] Rondo Alla Turca. I have written elsewhere about the dismissal of Turkey's central bank governor Naci Agbal and the rhytmical pattern of Turkey's political cycles (*). President Erdogan, who has repeatedly voiced his opposition to high interest rates, has the wrong interest rate in mind. In 1997, when Tony Blair and Gordon Brown announced the renewed independence of the Bank of England, the central bank governor lost no time in raising short-term interest rates. But because inflation expectations eased with the government's announcement, long-term interest rates went sharply down.
I was a masterstroke. Making a somewhat similar point, Robin Brooks, Chief Economist at IIF, writes on his Twitter account: "The tragedy of former CBRT Governor Agbal's dismissal is that his rate hikes eased financial conditions, i.e. were good for growth. They rebuilt Turkey's FX reserves, brought down CDS spreads & boosted Lira. All that is now being undone & it's bad for growth". In other words: and independent central bank —as an element of political checks and balances— contributes to a lower cost of capital.
(*) Agustin Mackinlay: "Rondo Alla Turca", LinkedIn, March 22, 2021.
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