PAUL RAHE ON ATHENIAN DEMAGOGUES

AM | @agumack

- Paul A. Rahe. Sparta's Second Attic War. The Grand Strategy of Classical Sparta, 446-418 B.C. Yale University Press, 2021, 384 pages.

When he wrote the all-important pages of the Histories on the best political regime, Herodotus imagined a debate among Persian grandees sometimes known as the 'Constitutional Dialogue' (III.82) (1, 2). Somewhat confusingly, Italian historian Cinzia Bearzot calls it le Tripolitique d'Hérodote [1]. Without the fictionary element of the dialogue, his 'writing voice' would have been too dry. Bringing his characters to life allowed him to create an immortal piece of political writing. I suspect that, for similar reasons, Plato felt compelled, in Book III of Laws (1, 2, 3, 4 and 5), to complement a somewhat dry analysis of Sparta's institutions with the lively counterpoint between Athens (liberty) and Persia (despotism). In fact, a similar point can be made about other writers, including Aristotle.

Paul Rahe's fourth volume on the 'Grand strategy of Sparta' achieves a comparable effect. The book allows the reader to understand Sparta's and Athens' political institutions almost as living organisms, as the two poleis mercilessly fought each other in the 'Second Attic War' between 446 and 418. Paul Rahe (PR) writes with passion. He has visited the historical sites described in the book, some of them more than once. He gets so carried away by his subject that he even writes "the son of Alcisthenes" for Demosthenes (etc.), and "the Athenians, the Corinthians" for Athens, Corinth, etc. There are 56 pages of notes, with bibliography in Greek, English, German, French and Italian. For a fan of erudition like myself, this is pure pleasure.

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In this post I will concentrate on Part III of the book ("Fortune's Wheel", 127-187). It covers the plague in Athens, all the way to the unexpected results of the equally unexpected Spartan defeat at Coryphasium-Sphacteria in 425. This is where, thanks to the brilliance of Thucydides, Sparta's and Athens' different constitutions and political cultures come alive in a really striking fashion. PR's narrative flows in four distinct movements: (1) The plague and its consequences; (2) The Athenians' "imprudent ventures"; (3) Surprise at Sphacteria; (4) The Athenian demagogues' hour. What matters, for my purpose, is how these events were perceived by Spartans and Athenians alike. 

Let us start with Athens [2 ]. PR quotes Pericles' warnings about the impact of the plague on human nature: "... that which is sudden and unexpected and comes to pass largley in defiance of reason [is apt to] enslave the mind and spirit". The plague, notes Thucydides, gave rise to a sharp increase in lawlessness (anomía) and to the emancipation of individual daring (tólma). With the son of Xanthippus out of the way, writes PR, the Athenians were subject to a severe loss of patience and focus. Therein lies the weakness of Athenian democracy in the fifth century: there was too much reliance on the prudence of the first man, who could lead the polis in a measured manner (metríos). 

PR doesn't hide his admiration for Athens in general, and for Pericles' talents and his "justified reputation for incorruptibility" in particular (p. 137). But he does a great job at describing the weak/dark side of Periclean democracy, as the demise of the leader paved the way for demagogues à la Cleon. These individuals had "an eye to private ambitions and private profit" at the expense of the interests of the polis (Thuc. 2.65). And it was precisely Pericles' "radical democracy" and "salaried city" that created the conditions for demagogues to thrive. Unsurprisingly, what followed was bad government on a colossal scale. The Athenians, writes Thucydides, "reached out for more" as pleonexía took hold of leaders' minds, the propensy for always seeking more and more, suggestive of húbris. 

Justice was trampled upon as "men of ambition" began "to use prosecution as a political weapon [...] and to prosecute magistrates and even private individuals on trumped-up charges" (pp. 171-172). "Cleon adopted a policy of intimidation, making prosecutions aimed at fining, permanently exiling, or executing his foes the norm". Taxes were raised as more phóros was demanded in order for Cleon to make good on his promise to increase by half the pay awarded jurors (p. 176). A few pages later, PR notes that the increase in phóros contributions created resentment, especially in the Thraceward region—with dramatic consequences for Athens, as Brasidas' job was greatly facilitated. 

To top it all off, the Athenians "opted at this point to ratchet up the pressure they had brought to bear on Sparta and her allies" (p. 176). Cleon rode the wave of euphoria created by the astonishing victory at Sphacteria while at the same time rejecting Sparta's peace ouvertures. "Had Pericles been alive, he would no doubt have seized on the victory at Sphacteria to negotiate a peace with Lacedaemon favorable to Athens's ambitions and fatal to the Peloponnesian League" (p. 181). As PR implies, Pericles would have refused to endorse the expedition to Boeotia that ended up in disaster at Delium, with the philosoper Socrates and a young man named "Alcibiades son of Cleinias" amongst the survivors. 

In  the end, Athens' refusal to negotiate a peace deal —coupled with the débâcle at Delium— "had the effect of strenghtening politically those among the Spartans who had all along argued that they had to be much more aggressive" (p. 186). I'd like to finish this post with a comment related to PR's view that the Athenians were prone "to take great risks which they should never have even considered and to exhibit caution when the rewards on offer were of supreme value" (p. 290). This is known in behavioural economics as the bias of loss aversion. 

What a great book.

[1] Cinzia Bearzot : « La monarchie dans le Tripolitique d'Hérodote », Ktéma : civilisations de l'Orient, de la Grèce et de Rome antiques, No. 40, 2015, pp. 115-124. The notion of a Tripolitique in Herodotus is confusing, because it is mainly used in the context of Dichaearchus' Τριπολιτικός [see].

[2] There is a brand new article on Thucydides and Athenian democracy: Mark Fisher. "Thucydides's Tragic Science of Democratic Defeat", The Review of Politics, January 22. I have not read it.
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